What next for us-europe trade policy

What next for us-europe trade policy

What next for US-Europe trade policy?

The economies of Europe and america are inextricably linked and within an ideal world, numerous factors motivate a trade deal like the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. This column, extracted from a recently available VoxEU eBook, argues, however, that given the Brexit referendum in the united kingdom and the election of Donald Trump as US president, in addition to a number of other pre-existing complications, achieving such agreements will be highly contentious.

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Editor’s note: This column first appeared as a chapter in the Vox eBook, Economics and policy in age Trump, open to download here.​

The economies of Europe and america are inextricably linked, they will be the world’s two largest economies, the EU may be the US’s largest trade partner (excluding the NAFTA trading bloc), as the United States may be the EU’s largest external trade partner in both goods and services. 1 THE UNITED STATES Department of Commerce estimates that US exports to the EU support around 2.6 million American jobs, while almost 200,000 European companies sell goods and services to america. 2 Furthermore, both economies constitute around 60% of the world’s inward stock of foreign direct investment (FDI), and over 80% of the world’s outward stock of FDI, a big portion of which is because of flows between your two (European Parliament 2016).

Within an ideal world, several factors motivate a trade deal including the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). However, given the June 23, 2016 Brexit referendum in the united kingdom and the November 2016 US election results, in addition to a number of other pre-existing complications, achieving such agreements (now both EU-US and UK-US) will be highly contentious.

Tricky but achievable – tariff cuts

The first obvious point of contact a trade deal is tariffs. Most Favourable Nation (MFN) import tariffs for both EU and america are, normally, low, and there’s a good chance the united kingdom will keep up with the tariffs it currently operates as an EU member, after Brexit is complete (HM Government 2016). The weighted mean tariff for all products, for both EU and US is 1.6%, and therefore, at face value, it seems changes to tariffs are relatively unimportant.

However, normally could possibly be the case, averages have a habit of hiding some sector specific high tariffs. For instance, the EU tariff on automobiles is 10%, as the US counterpart is 2.5%, similarly EU tariffs on fish is often as high as 25% while US tariffs on fabrics and apparel are in similar levels. Leaked TTIP documents showed that, by negotiations towards the end of 2015, tariffs could have been reduced by up to 97.5% (von Daniels and Orosz 2016). It’s no real surprise that the trade deal received backing from business groups including the German Association of the Automotive Industry, who estimate that tariffs cost the industry approximately €1 billion each year (IMCO 2015).

Trickier but reasonable – non-tariff barriers

While tariffs will be the starting place of trade agreements, the main motivating factor of modern trade deals may be the removal of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), such as for example regulatory differences, through harmonisation of standards and customs procedures and regulatory cooperation across borders. Types of divergent regulation include differences safely standards, environmental and emissions regulations, eligibility of foreign firms for government procurement, and competition policy, while NTBs in customs procedures generally relate with things such as for example port inspections and rules of origin.

The regulatory divergence between your EU and USA is non-trivial and far ranging. One factor may be the statutory application of the precautionary principle in EU law, without any similar equivalent in america. The precautionary principle, which results in the responsibility of proof safety falling on those desperate to take an action in the lack of scientific consensus, has implications for regulations linked to environmental, pharmaceutical, agricultural and product standards.

As highlighted by Fontagné et al. (2013), there are a few simple answers to closing these differences, such as for example an extension of mutual recognition of technical standards and expanded labelling for foods. However, when regulation exists because of a clear difference in preferences, convergence is normally problematic.

An assessment of tests by Berden and Francois (2015) found the trade cost equivalent (TCE) (i.e., the synthetic ad-valorem tariff equivalent) on all goods between your EU and US range between 12.9% to 13.7%, with some sectors such as for example agricultural products, beverages and tobacco, pharmaceuticals and processed food items being considerably higher. Importantly, for modern economies like the US and the united kingdom, where the most employment is currently in the service sector, they find estimates of TCEs for the service sector ranging between 8.5% and 47.3%, with specific sectors such as for example business services and financial services facing normally around 30% TCE. All studies reviewed conclude that NTBs matter, and way more than tariffs. A written report by ECORYS commissioned by the European Commission (Berden et al. 2009) suggested that between 25-50% of the NTBs could possibly be removed, and, in the more optimistic scenario, exports would increase by 6.1% for the united states and 2.1% for the EU. According to a report from the CEPR (Francois et al. 2013), a FTA that removed 25% of NTBs would boost trade by 75% greater than a FTA that removed only 10% of NTBs.

These estimates connect with the EU, including the united kingdom. In a post-Brexit world, matters get somewhat more difficult. THE UNITED KINGDOM government has managed to get abundantly clear that they would like to exit the EU Customs Union to allow them to pursue their own trade handles the likes of america (HM Government 2016). This seems just like a logical way of creating for the losses in trade and investment that could arise when the united kingdom breaks from its largest trade and investment partner – the EU. Estimates claim that wiping out tariffs between your UK and the united states would replace only a tiny share of the losses from Brexit. It is because the US is a far more distant market for the united kingdom so there is naturally less trade between them. With tariffs already low, expansion in UK-US trade would want far more regulatory harmonisation (Dhingra et al. 2017). Considering that the united kingdom currently operates the same regulatory framework as all of those other EU, the same regulatory divergence problems arise in the UK-US relationship. And, without the clout of the EU, UK trade negotiators could have significantly less bargaining power in obtaining a good deal from the united states, for obvious reasons (both US’s GDP and population are approximately five times bigger than the UK’s).

The implementation of regulatory cooperation between your US and the united kingdom would also face practical difficulties. Beyond the EU, the united kingdom will have to replicate around 34 different regulatory agencies for various sectors (Fraser 2017), which are operated through the EU. This might require a large upsurge in nuanced expertise and civil servants, and be infeasible given the existing two-year timeframe for Brexit. THE UNITED KINGDOM could stay beneath the remit of some EU regulatory agencies, which could be a necessary part of a fresh trade agreement between your UK and EU. But this might mean the UK must resolve its new trading arrangements with the EU before trying to lessen NTBs with america. Furthermore, constraints upon this would still apply in sectors that continue being overseen by EU regulatory agencies, unless an EU-US deal is struck in tandem. Any potential US-UK trade deal is therefore apt to be delayed for at least a year or two, regardless of the enthusiasm of their current governments.

The achievable and the reasonable – trade and income impacts

The big gains from a transatlantic deal should come from lower tariffs and NTBs. Estimates from the CEPII (Fontagné et al. 2013) claim that the impacts of a TTIP-like deal on incomes will be non-trivial. Specifically, in the scenario of a complete phase-out of tariffs coupled with a 25% reduction in NTBs, the EU would visit a $98bn positive impact to GDP as the US would experience a $64bn gain. Estimates from ECORYS (European Commission 2016), suggest similar impacts to GDP of around 0.3% for both areas, while also predicting a rise of 0.5% for wages of both high and low- skilled workers by 2030. Furthermore, on the labour front, some models aren’t in a position to predict employment effects because of assumptions of full employment, some estimates of labour displacement for a 2027 benchmark range between 0.2%, in a less ambitious deal, to 0.65%, in a far more ambitious deal (Francois et al. 2013).

These estimates aren’t without contention however. Civil society organisations have highlighted the failings of estimates of previous trade agreements such as for example NAFTA (e.g., Hilary 2015). The most widely cited studies (Hufbauer and Schott 1992) predicted a big 130,000 employment gain for the united states, while another predicted an approximate 0.3% welfare gain in conjunction with a 0.2% upsurge in real wages for the united states, and a 0.7% welfare gain for Canada (Brown et al. 1992).

In comparison to ex post studies, such figures appear highly inaccurate. Recent work finds that the US’s welfare increased by simply 0.08%, while Canada’s declined by 0.06% (Caliendo and Parro 2014). Importantly, labour market evidence points to dramatically lower wage growth for blue collar workers in america, and knock on effects to service workers within their localities due to NAFTA (Hakobyan and McLaren 2016).

Domestic policies have previously didn’t do much for people who have been displaced by increased globalisation and technological change. Amid this distrust of globalisation, additional job displacements and churning would make a transatlantic deal a lot more unwelcome. But by far the best discontent from another transatlantic deal depends on what the EU and the united states cope with the rights of foreign investors in the agreement.

Preventing the death knell: Investor to convey disputes

Foreign investment may be the ‘real driver’ (Gambini et al. 2015) of the transatlantic economic relationship. The EU and the united states take into account about 40% (Eurostat 2016b) of every other’s inward FDI stock. Any investment-related clause in the trade deal between your EU, the united states and the united kingdom therefore has far-reaching implications for firms, workers and consumers.

The TTIP’s proposed mechanism for settling disputes between foreign firms and host governments is its most controversial component. The top of trade policy of the UK’s Labour Party described it as a ‘threat to democracy’ (Hilary 2015) and the best threat posed by TTIP. Initial texts contained an Investment State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism (European Commission 2015), gives foreign firms the proper to bring claims against host country governments if indeed they have not been given ‘fair and equitable treatment’.

According to economic theory, investor protections, such as for example ISDS, enable firms to recoup damages from host country governments, if indeed they take part in policies that decrease the returns to sunk investments created by foreign firms (Blanchard 2015). Host country governments might directly expropriate the assets of foreign firms or set up domestic policies that harm the profitability of foreign investments.

The WTO disciplines the utilization of trade-related domestic policies, such as for example local content requirements or forex rationing, that favour domestic firms over foreign investors. Nonetheless it targets investment measures which have the potential to restrict or distort trade, and will not cover behind-the-border policies that aren’t trade-related (Blanchard 2014). TTIP seeks to fill this gap in policy through its proposed ISDS, which allows foreign investors to dispute any alleged breach of commitments of the host country.

This seems such as a sensible method of attract foreign investments which can otherwise be too risky to attempt in the host country because of its changing political, legal or social circumstances. But one concern is that, beneath the ISDS, disputes brought by foreign investors are resolved by a tribunal that’s beyond your scrutiny of the host country’s legal system. Another is that the group of behind-the border policies that affect foreign investors is indeed broad that the risk of disputes can severely limit the policy space open to governments. For example, Calgary-based company Lone Pine Resources, which is registered in Delaware, has claimed damages for the potential losses from the Quebec government’s moratorium on fracking. Although a decision is pending, this case is among the most poster child for the chilling ramifications of ISDS on government’s capability to regulate (Beltrame 2013). Many therefore view ISDS as a means of giving foreign firms excessive powers – typically unavailable to domestic firms – to challenge policies decided by national and local governments, especially in socially sensitive areas like environment, natural resources and public health.

These concerns are also reflected in a recently available case against Germany brought by a Swedish firm beneath the Energy Charter Treaty. Following the Fukushima nuclear accident in March 2011, Germany announced it could withdraw the operating licences of eight nuclear power plants, including two plants of the Swedish company Vattenfall (World Nuclear News 2014).

Vattenfall sued Germany at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes in Washington DC over the closure of its plants and demanded USD 6 billion as compensation. Meanwhile, the German Constitutional Court ruled that the State gets the broad regulatory powers to take such a decision nonetheless it must compensate the plants for just about any unjustified expropriation due to its decision (Kluwer 2016).

This prompted the question – why must Vattenfall sue Germany via an international tribunal when the domestic legal system is with the capacity of making fair decisions? Civil society groups argue that developed economies with a solid legal system don’t need extra-judicial bodies to solve foreign investment disputes (Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Brauch 2014). As public money is involved, damages shouldn’t be decided by arbitrators who are by no means accountable to the general public, and whose decisions can’t be reviewed for legal or factual correctness. Prominent cases like they are more likely to harden public opinion against TTIP. Already, a YouGov survey from 2016 demonstrates support for TTIP has fallen dramatically – just 17% of Germans and 18% of Americans believe TTIP is a ‘good thing’, in comparison to over 50% 2 yrs before (Bluth 2016).

Treading the populist path

Citizen groups and academics have expressed grave concerns in public areas consultations 3 about the ISDS, and Parenti (2017) shows that opposition from member countries like Belgium, France and Germany has prompted the EU to go from the language of the ISDS. However the EU and the united states remain steadfast within their decision to add an investor to convey dispute settlement provision in another deal. This tends to take its cue from the pending EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA).

CETA offers an investment court system which addresses a number of the concerns with the ISDS such as for example appointing public judges, having an appeal system and tightening the language on what constitutes fair and equitable treatment for foreign investors.

If the investment court system is ratified under CETA, the main element way to obtain contention in another EU-US deal will be largely bypassed. Based on the consumer advocacy group, Public Citizen, that was founded by Ralph Nader, over 80% of US-owned subsidiaries in the EU participate in parent US firms that likewise have operations in Canada. These US firms would curently have usage of the investment court system through CETA, and wouldn’t normally have to await TTIP’s investment chapter. The EU expects the investment court system to be the model because of its investor dispute settlement process in future trade deals (Biel and Wheeler 2016). But questions over the legitimacy of the investment court system persist (Dearden 2016), and its own legality will be decided by the finish of 2017 (Dentons 2017).

On the united states side, the poll findings of Democracy Corps, in the context of the united states Trans- Pacific Partnership, are instructive in gauging what sort of future debate over investment provisions might play out. Most the Americans polled were not really acquainted with the agreement or neutral towards it, but a the greater part – 70% – became more against the agreement after hearing the anti-ISDS statements which were read aloud to them. If the debate over TTIP centres on investment protections, the general public might perceive their governments to be favouring big multinationals, and we would yet see another backlash against future deals between your US and Europe.

This would imply that the potential efficiency gains from streamlining duplicate regulations and tariff peaks will be lost in a zeal to provide special rights to foreign investors. There is little empirical evidence these rights increase foreign investments, so an economically sound alternative may be the US-Australia trade agreement, which settles investor to convey disputes within the domestic court system. This precedent was motivated by Australia pointing out that developed economies with advanced domestic legal systems don’t need ISDS-type clauses because their domestic court systems have a recognised record of upholding the rule of law (Faunce 2015). THE UNITED STATES, UK and EU fit this bill. It’s unsurprising then that the independent study commissioned by the UK’s Business, Innovation and Skills department figured ISDS-type clauses would provide little economic benefit and expose the State to meaningful political costs (Poulsen et al. 2013).

In today’s era of strong anti-globalisation sentiments, even small political costs could heighten economic nationalism. Recent political developments – Trump, Brexit and the anti-EU rhetoric – reflect a desire to rebalance economic power and reclaim sovereignty (Colantone and Stanig 2017). After years of uneven economic growth and austerity cuts, folks have used their votes expressing anger at the political establishment and their failed economic policies (Dhingra 2016). Proposing trade deals that provide special rights to foreign investors, located in countries less aligned to the prevailing preferences of citizens, would alienate people further, and likely derail future transatlantic partnerships.

References

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Endnotes

1 Predicated on data from US Dept. Commerce (2016), European Commission (2016a) and Eurostat (2016a).

2 Predicated on data from US Trade Representative (2013) and European Commission (2016b).

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